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Abstract 
The paper analyzes the intertemporal spending behavior of Norwegian local governments 
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perfectly forward looking nor fully myopic. (ii) Local governments with good fiscal 
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1. Introduction 
 
Several contributions have investigated whether governments’ tax and spending patterns are 
consistent with rational forward looking behavior. Such behavior basically means that tax and 
spending decisions are determined by permanent resources, and that the deficit should be the 
main absorber of short term shocks. Empirical analyses of national governments have 
concentrated on ‘tax smoothing’ and have investigated whether tax rates can be described as 
random walks. The results of Barro (1979, 1981) support the tax smoothing hypothesis for the 
U.S. and the U.K., but according to Roubini and Sachs (1989) who analyze 15 OECD 
countries, the U.S. and the U.K. appear to be special cases. 
 
The related literature on subnational governments has concentrated on the intertemporal 
pattern of public spending and resource use. Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1989, 1991, 1993) 
analyze respectively capital spending, labor demand, and construction spending using data for 
U.S. municipalities. They apply the approach developed by Hall (1978), i.e. they estimate 
Euler equations and test whether the lag structure is consistent with a model based on rational 
forward looking behavior. The results are generally supportive of forward looking behavior, 
but the behavior seems to differ between different groups of municipalities. The spending 
behavior of small (in terms of population size) and suburban municipalities is consistent with 




The Euler equation approach facilitates a test of whether spending behavior is consistent with 
rational forward looking behavior, but, in the case of rejection, the approach provides no 
information on the quantitative departure from such behavior. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) apply 
the so-called ‘λ -model’ developed by Campbell and Mankiw (1990), and are then able to 
determine the fraction of local public spending that is governed by permanent resources and 
the fraction that is governed by current resources. Using aggregate time series data for state 
and local government spending in the U.S., rational forward looking behavior is clearly 
rejected. Moreover, the quantitative departure from such behavior is substantial since they 
                                                           
1 In the analysis of construction spending (Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1993) they also perform a more explicit test 
of the impact of anticipated and unanticipated changes in the community’s resources. The same approach is used 
by Rattsø (1999) in a study of investment spending in Norwegian local governments. Both studies find that only 
anticipated spending is important in the long term.   2
find (p. 173) “that essentially 100% of the growth rate of state and local spending on 
nondurable items is determined by the decision maker’s contemporaneous level of resources.” 
Dahlberg and Lindström (1998) estimate the λ -model using data for Swedish municipalities, 
and with very different results compared to Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994). Using panel data, their 
estimates indicate that (p. 269) “spending decisions on nondurable goods and services are to a 
very high degree (90% or more) associated with permanent resources.”
2 Moreover, 
municipalities in the southern part of Sweden are more forward looking than those in the 
northern part, but there is no significant difference between socialist and conservative 
municipalities. 
 
In this paper we estimate the λ - model on a large panel data set for Norwegian local 
governments. The analysis should be of interest for several reasons. First, given the sharp 
difference between the American and Swedish studies, more evidence is needed to improve 
our understanding of the dynamic spending behavior of local governments. Second, within the 
λ - model it is not clear how departure from rational forward looking behavior should be 
interpreted. Does it reflect that local governments are myopic, or does it reflect liquidity 
constraints? Our aim is to discriminate between these two interpretations by splitting the 
sample according to fiscal conditions. A positive correlation between fiscal conditions and the 
degree of forward looking behavior will be interpreted as support for liquidity constraints. On 
the other hand, myopic behavior is supported if the degree of departure from forward looking 
behavior is unrelated to fiscal conditions. This way of splitting the sample is similar to the 
approach taken in the empirical literature investigating whether households are liquidity 
constrained, and may provide more interesting interpretations than the sample splits used in 
the earlier analyses of local governments (population size, suburban vs. non-suburban, 
geography, and political ideology). Moreover, we split the sample according to political 
characteristics based on previous evidence that fragmented leaderships behave more short 
sighted. Correlation between fragmentation and the degree of forward looking behavior could 
be interpreted as evidence of myopic behavior. 
 
                                                           
2 The difference between the American and Swedish estimates is partly due to the nature of the data in the two 
studies. When Dahlberg and Lindström reestimate their model on aggregate time series data, the proportion of 
spending decisions associated with permanent resources is reduced to 60-70%. Empirical analyses of household 
behavior show the same pattern. Whereas rational forward looking behavior is strongly rejected in aggregate 
time series studies, the results are less clear when microeconomic data is applied (Jappelli et al., 1998, p. 251). 
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The analysis is also of practical relevance for the way the local public sector is currently used 
in the macroeconomic stabilization policy. In Norway the local public sector is responsible 
for the provision of important welfare services like education and health care, and it makes up 
a large part of the total economy. During the period under study the revenues of the local 
public sector (local governments and counties) amounted to around 20% of GDP, and through 
the grant system and income tax revenue sharing the revenue growth is largely in the hands of 
the central government. As documented by Borge and Rattsø (2002a), the regulation of local 
revenues is part of the general fiscal policy. In recessions, the central government increases 
grants and the share of taxes received by local governments in order to stimulate aggregate 
demand. In booms, the opposite policy is implemented to reduce aggregate demand. This 
policy will only be effective if local government spending behavior to some extent is 
determined by current resources, i.e. not fully forward looking. Moreover, if the degree of 
departure from forwarding looking behavior is related to fiscal conditions, the effectiveness 
may vary over time depending on the degree of fiscal stress in the local public sector. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an intertemporal model of 
local government spending behavior, while Section 3 provides details about the Norwegian 
balanced-budget-rule and derives hypotheses regarding intertemporal spending behavior. Data 
and estimation methods are discussed in Section 4, and the estimation results are presented in 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main findings of the paper. 
 
2. Local government spending behavior in an intertemporal context 
 
The point of departure is a community preference model (Wildasin, 1986, ch. 3) where the 
representative voter receives utility from current production of local public services and the 
current level of private consumption. Following Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1994), the model is 
extended to a dynamic setting where the representative voter receives utility from current and 
future flow of local public services (G). At the beginning of period t, expected utility (Vt) is 
given by 
 


















                                                                                              (1) 
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where ρ denotes the rate of time preferences, 1/σ  the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
and Et expectations conditional on information available at the beginning of period t. 
 
The utility function focuses on the consumption of local public services and leaves out private 
consumption. The justification for this formulation is that the Norwegian system of financing 
is highly centralized. Grants and taxes shared with the central government account for more 
than 80% of total revenue, and these revenue sources are under central government control. 
The opportunity to influence current revenues is limited to property tax and user charges. But 
since the property tax is of little importance (around 5% of tax revenues) and user charges are 
limited to cover costs, we make the simplifying assumption that the local governments face a 
fixed level of revenue in each period. This is in line with earlier Norwegian studies of local 
government expenditures, e.g. Borge and Rattsø (1995).
3 The intertemporal decision problem 
is then to find an optimal path for provision of local public services given expectations about 
future revenues.  
 
As a point of departure, we assume that local governments have access to a perfect credit 
market where they can save and borrow at the same interest rate. Then the decision-making 
process may be described as maximization of Vt subject to the following constraints 
 
































                                                                                                 (3) 
 
where Wt denotes net wealth at the beginning of period t, rt the real interest rate on wealth 
carried from period t-1 to period t, and Rt local government revenue in period t. The unit cost 
of local public services is normalized to unity. Equation (2) describes how net wealth evolves 
over time, whereas equation (3) rules out perpetual debt financing. The information set at the 
beginning of period t includes current revenue (Rt) and the current real interest rate (rt). The 
                                                           
3 Dahlberg and Lindström (1998) formulate an intertemporal model with local tax discretion, but in the end they 
estimate the same equation as us. 
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dynamic budget constraint assumes that local governments can use financial markets to 
choose a time path for spending that deviates from the time path for revenues.  
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By assuming joint lognormality in the real interest rate and spending (Hansen and Singleton, 
1983), the Euler equation can be simplified to  
 
EG E r tt t t −− =+ 11
1
(l n ) () Δ μ
σ
                                                                                       (5) 
 
where μ  is a constant. If the real interest rate is constant, equation (5) implies that (the 
logarithm of) local government spending follows a random walk with drift. No variables 
known at the beginning of period t-1 should have any predictive power for consecutive 
spending growth. A key aspect of the solution is that local government spending is 
determined by permanent resources (the present value of current and future revenue), the real 
interest rate, and time preferences. Expected fluctuations in current revenues will not show up 
in the spending path since local governments can use financial markets to smooth spending 
over time. On the other hand, an unexpected revenue change will lead to a revision of 
permanent resources and thereby affect the immediate spending growth.  
 
Campbell and Mankiw (1990) extend the above model by assuming that a proportion (1-λ ) 
of spending is determined by permanent resources, whereas a proportion λ  is linked to 
current revenue (in the sense thatΔ Δ ln ln GR tt = ). The parameter λ  may be interpreted as 
the proportion of local governments that behave myopically or the proportion of spending that 
is determined by current resources.
4 The so-called λ - model can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                           
4 Given the logarithmic formulation of the model, this interpretation only holds as an approximation. 
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                                           (6) 
 
The λ - model has the advantage that it makes it possible not only to test whether spending 
behavior is consistent with rational forward looking behavior, but also to quantify the degree 
of departure from such behavior. The quantitative departure from rational forward looking 
behavior is larger in the case where λ  is 0.8 compared to the case where it is 0.2. On the 
other hand, the λ -model does not specify why agents depart from rational forward looking 
behavior. A positive and significant λ  is evidence of ‘excess sensitivity’, but we do not know 
whether agents are liquidity constrained (unable to smooth spending over time) or just myopic 
(behavior is not guided by an intertemporal utility function). 
 
In most countries local governments face balanced budget rules (BBRs) that may affect their 
intertemporal spending behavior. BBRs may affect the ability to take advantage of financial 
markets to smooth spending over time, and as such they are important for the extent to which 
spending is determined by permanent resources. Moreover, since BBRs may have 
heterogeneous effects for different groups of local governments, they may help to identify 
whether departure from rational forward looking behavior is due to myopia or liquidity 
constraints. In the next section we discuss the Norwegian BBR and how it can be utilized in 
the empirical analysis. 
 
3. The BBR and the ability to smooth spending over time 
 
In general, local governments may face liquidity constraints of two reasons. First, they may 
meet credit market constraints in the same way as firms and households. Second, they may be 
liquidity constrained because of BBRs imposed by higher-level government. In Norway, 
credit market constraints are of little importance. The effective constraint is that the county 
governor must approve borrowing as part of the control of the budgets.
5 If borrowing is 
approved, local governments can easily find credit institutions willing to lend them money. 
Since local governments can not go bankrupt and are expected to be bailed out by the national 
                                                           
5 The county governor is the central government’s representative in the county. The description of the regulation 
of borrowing and control of budgets refers to the rules that applied during the period under study. From 2001 
this control system has become more selective and only applies to local governments that have violated the BBR 
in recent years. 
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government in case of a severe financial crisis, loans to local governments are considered to 
have extremely low risk. We therefore concentrate on the BBR as the primary source of 
liquidity constraints. 
 
The main requirement in the Norwegian BBR is operational budget balance.
6 In the budget, 
the net operating surplus must be non-negative, i.e. current revenues must be sufficient to 
cover current expenditures, interest payments and regular installment of debt. This means that 
loan financing of current expenditures is not allowed. Since the present analysis focuses on 
current expenditures, it is important to notice that it is possible to smooth current expenditures 
within the requirement of operational budget balance. First, the typical case is that local 
governments have net operating surpluses and that a substantial part of investments is 
financed by surpluses.
7 A local government that expects a temporary reduction in current 
revenues can therefore avoid a corresponding reduction in current expenditures by reducing 
the fraction of investments financed by a positive net operating surplus, and finance a larger 
fraction of investments by borrowing. This strategy obeys the BBR as long as the local 
government still runs a surplus. Second, it is possible to have a net operating deficit if it can 
be financed by specific rainy-day funds that are built up by past surpluses. 
 
Finally, since the requirement of operational budgetary balance is imposed ex ante, current 
expenditures can be smoothed by having deficits ex post.
8 A net operating deficit is not a rare 
event, and in a typical year 15-20% of the local governments run deficits. Although deficits 
are quite common, we can not immediately conclude that they are used to smooth 
expenditures in response to expected revenue decreases. In order to run a deficit as a response 
to an expected revenue decrease, the submitted budget must be balanced by gimmicking, i.e. 
by deliberate overestimation of revenues and/ or underestimation of expenditures. On the 
other hand, the observed deficits could be caused by revenue- or expenditure shocks during 
the fiscal year. Rattsø (2004) provide evidence on the importance of fiscal shocks, but it can 
not be ruled out that the observed deficits to some extent reflect gimmicking to smooth 
consumption. 
                                                           
6 We refer to Borge and Rattsø (2002b) for a more detailed discussion of the regulations of budgets and 
borrowing in the Norwegian institutional context. 
7 As an average (over time and across local governments) nearly 50% of investments are financed by positive 
net operating surpluses. 
8 Ex post deficits must be “repaid” within 2 years, i.e. the surpluses in the following two years must in aggregate 
be at least as large as the deficit.   8
 
The above discussion shows that it is possible for Norwegian local governments to take 
advantage of financial markets to smooth current expenditures, and it is therefore highly 
relevant to investigate whether their intertemporal spending behavior is consistent with 
rational forward looking behavior. Moreover, the ability to smooth current expenditures may 
vary between local governments depending on their fiscal conditions. The first strategy to 
smooth current expenditures, increasing the fraction of investments financed by borrowing, is 
only available for local governments that have a surplus at the outset. And the second 
strategy, use of rainy-day funds, assumes that funds are built up in the first place. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that local governments with good fiscal conditions are less 
constrained by the BBR than local governments with weaker fiscal conditions. 
 
A main contribution by our empirical analysis is that we investigate whether local 
governments with different fiscal conditions have different intertemporal spending behavior. 
We follow the empirical literature that has investigated whether private households are 
liquidity constrained (e.g. Zeldes, 1989; Runkle, 1991; Shea, 1995), and split the sample 
according to fiscal conditions.
 9 As indicators of fiscal conditions we use net operating 
surplus, available funds, and revenues. The general idea is that the BBR to a larger extent will 
impose liquidity constraints on local governments with weak fiscal conditions compared to 
local governments with good fiscal conditions. A negative relationship between the estimate 
of λ  and fiscal conditions can therefore be taken as evidence that departure from rational 
forward looking behavior to some extent can be explained by the BBR. However, a negative 
relationship between λ  and fiscal conditions can not rule out myopia if λ  is significantly 
positive also for local governments with good fiscal conditions. Myopia may only be ruled 
out if the spending behavior of local governments with the best fiscal conditions is fully 
consistent with rational forward looking behavior, i.e. if we can not reject the hypothesis that 
λ =0 for this group. 
 
                                                           
9 The studies of private households split the sample according to wealth. The idea is that if liquidity constraints 
are important, the permanent-income hypothesis should be rejected for low wealth households, but not for high-
wealth households. The results are mixed. The findings of Zeldes (1989) are consistent with liquidity 
constraints, whereas Runkle (1991) can not reject the permanent income hypothesis for neither high nor low-
wealth households. Shea (1995) rejects the permanent-income hypothesis for both types of households, and the 
results are inconsistent with liquidity constraints.   9
However, even if we fail to reject the permanent income hypothesis for local governments 
with the best fiscal conditions, the above procedure is no more than an indirect test of myopia. 
A more direct test would be to split the sample according to some variable capturing myopia, 
and in the empirical analysis we will use the degree of party fragmentation as a possible 
indicator. Recent studies have shown that fragmentation is associated with weak fiscal 
performance in terms of large deficits, which may reflect short sighted behavior. We refer to 
Borge (2005) and Hagen and Vabo (2005) for evidence from Norwegian local governments 
and to Ashworth et al. (2005) for a recent review of international studies.  
 
4. Data and econometric analysis 
 
The econometric analysis is based on the empirical counterpart of equation (6) 
 
ln ln it t it it i it GR Z β λγ α ε Δ= + Δ+ Δ + +                                                                         (7) 
 
where  it G  and  it R  are respectively spending and revenue in local government i in year t. The 
year fixed effects  t β  capture the real interest rate and other macroeconomic variables that 
vary over time and are common to all local governments. Z is a vector of control variables 
that may affect the marginal utility of local public spending. The age composition of the 
population and the local unemployment rate are included in Z. Finally,  i α  is a community 
specific term. 
 
The model is estimated on a balanced panel data set of Norwegian local governments. The 
data set includes 411 local governments during the period 1980-1996.
10 Spending and revenue 
data are obtained from Statistics Norway. Since the discussion in Section 2 assumes that G is 
nondurable spending, the preferred spending measure would be local government spending on 
nondurable goods and services. Unfortunately, data on nondurable spending is not available 
in any statistics and we choose to rely on current expenditures, which includes wages and 
purchases of goods and services for non-investment purposes. A potential problem with this 
                                                           
10 In 1996 the total number of local government is 435. Local governments affected by consolidations during the 
period under study are excluded. A few local governments with unreasonable high or low spending or revenue 
growth (in at least one year) were also excluded from the sample.   10
approach is that the spending measure may include some spending on durables.
11 The revenue 
measure includes local taxes, user charges, grants from the central government, and interest. 
Spending and revenue are measured per capita and deflated by the national account’s price 
index for local government consumption. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 displays the development of local government spending and revenue during the 
period under study. There are two breaks in the series. First, the sharp increase in spending 
and revenue from 1987 to 1988 is due to a shift in the functional responsibility, in which local 
governments became responsible for some health care institutions that were earlier county 
responsibilities. Second, the figures underestimate the actual spending and revenue growth in 
1991 due to new accounting standards. Some preliminary analyses indicated that these breaks 
were not sufficiently captured by the year fixed effects, and it was necessary to allow separate 
λ ’s for both 1988 and 1991. There has been a steady growth in spending and revenues during 
the period under study. For the period as a whole the growth has been reasonably balanced. 
The average annual growth rates are respectively 2.9% and 3.0% for spending and revenue.
12  
 
Two different formulations of the model are estimated. First, since equation (7) is in first 
difference, it can be argued that the community specific effects already are taken care of and 
can be set to zero. The simplest way to proceed would then be to estimate equation (7) with 
OLS on the pooled data set. However, OLS is likely to produce biased estimates even in the 
absence of community specific terms. The reason is that the error term (εit ) can be interpreted 
as the revision of future resources between period t-1 and period t. And if the revision of 
future resources is linked to the growth of current resources (Δln ) Rit , OLS will be biased. 
We rely on the generalized method of moments (GMM) as developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). Lagged values of spending and revenue dated t-2 and back are valid instruments if the 
error term  it ε  is serially uncorrelated. 
 
                                                           
11 Dahlberg and Lindström (1998) face the same problem as us, and use spending on personnel as a proxy for 
nondurable spending. The potential problem with their approach is that the spending measure will be sensitive to 
how local government production is organized. Spending on personnel can be separated out if local government 
employees produce a service, but not when the same service is contracted out to a private firm. 
12 The years 1988 and 1991 are not included in these calculations.   11
Although equation (7) is in first difference, heterogeneity in time preferences (ρ ) across local 
governments is an argument for including community specific effects. In order to allow for 
different time preferences, we remove the community specific effect by differentiating 
equation (7): 
 
22 2 ln ln it t it it it GR Z β λγ ε Δ= Δ + Δ+ Δ + Δ                                                                      (8) 
 
Since correlation between  it ε  and  ln it R Δ  most likely will carry over to Δεit  and Δ
2 lnRit , we 
also estimate the second difference by GMM. 
 
The GMM procedure provides one-step and two-step estimates. The two-step procedure is 
efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity, but as shown by Arrelano and Bond (1991), the 
estimated standard errors tend to be downward biased in finite samples. Instead we report 
first-step estimates and standard errors that are corrected for heteroskedasticity. When it 
comes to the Sargan test for the joint hypothesis of valid instruments and correct model 
specification, we use the two-step version since the one-step version is not robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Lagged values of spending and revenue dated t-2 and back are valid 
instruments if  it ε  is serially uncorrelated. However, some preliminary investigation and 
testing showed that lagged values of spending as well as revenue dated t-2 did not perform 
well as instruments. The GMM estimates presented in the preceding sections are obtained 
using revenue dated t-3 to t-7 as instruments. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
The estimation results for the pooled sample are displayed in Table 2, where the left panel 
shows the results for first difference and the right panel the results for the second difference. 
In both cases we report three sets of estimates, i.e. OLS, GMM, and GMM with age 
composition and unemployment rate as controls. We observe that the estimate of λ  varies 
more between first and second difference than between the three estimation methods. The first 
difference estimates indicate that up to 40% or less of local public spending is guided by 
permanent resources, compared to around 65% for the second difference estimates. All 
equations document the importance of controlling for the shift in functional responsibility in 
1988 and the change in the accounting system from 1991. Both shifts induced a higher   12
correlation between spending and revenue growth, and would have led to overestimation of λ  
if not controlled for. Unemployment and share of elderly have a significant impact in the first 
difference specification, but the estimate of λ  is quite robust to whether the additional 
controls are included or not. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The specification tests indicate that the results from the pooled sample should be interpreted 
with caution. The hypothesis of valid instruments and correct model specification is clearly 
rejected by the Sargan test, both for the first and the second difference. However, the tests for 
auto correlation provide some support for the second difference specification over first 
difference. The presence of first order autocorrelation, but no second order, in the second 
difference specification is consistent with a serially uncorrelated error term and community 
specific effects in equation (7). The first and second order autocorrelation in the first 
difference specification probably reflect that (the relevant) community specific effects are not 
taken into account. 
 
Heterogeneous spending behavior is a possible reason for the rejections of valid instruments 
and correct model specification. As discussed in Section 3, the extent to which local 
governments are liquidity constrained may depend on their fiscal conditions, and the degree 
of myopia may be related to the party fragmentation of the local council. In Tables 3-6 we 
have split the sample according net operating surplus, funds, revenues, and party 
fragmentation. The split is based on average values during the period under study (see the 
Appendix for details), and for each group we have a balanced panel of 137 local governments. 
We use GMM without additional controls and report results for both first and second 
difference. In general the hypothesis of valid instruments and correct model specification can 
not be rejected for the second difference specification on the split samples.
13 And again, the 
autocorrelation tests are favorable to the second difference specification. In the following 
                                                           
13 Valid instruments and correct model specification is not rejected in 11 of 12 cases at the 5% level of 
significance, and in 10 of 12 cases at the 10% level. Dahlberg and Lindström (1998) do also reject valid 
instruments and correct model specification for their pooled sample, but not on split samples.   13
discussion we will focus on the second difference estimates, although all qualitative 
conclusions also apply to the first difference estimates.
14 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In Table 3 the sample is spilt by net operating surplus per capita. The estimate ofλ  is 0.04 for 
the high surplus group and nearly 0.50 for the medium and low surplus groups. Moreover, 
while perfect forward looking behavior is clearly rejected for the two latter groups, it can not 
be rejected for the high surplus group.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
In Table 4 the sample is split by funds per capita. The funds of Norwegian local governments 
can broadly be separated into two groups; investment funds that are earmarked for investment 
purposes, and non-earmarked funds that can be used to finance current expenditures as well as 
investments. Since both types of funds facilitate consumption smoothing (see the discussion 
in Section 3), the sample split is based on the total amount of funds.
15 The results are similar 
to those in Table 3 in the sense that perfect forward looking behavior is rejected for local 
governments with low or medium level of funds, but not for the group with the highest level 
of funds. For local governments with low and medium level of funds the quantitative 
departure from perfect forward looking behavior is substantial, only 40-50% of spending is 
determined by permanent resources. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 displays the results when the sample is split by per capita revenue. It appears that 
rational forward looking behavior is clearly rejected for all revenue groups. And although the 
point estimate of λ  is lowest for the high revenue group, there is no simple monotonic 
relationship between the level of revenue and departure from forward looking behavior (in the 
                                                           
14 The direction of the difference between groups of local governments is robust to whether the model is 
estimated on first or second difference. As for the pooled sample, the main difference is that spending behavior 
appears to be less forward looking in the first difference specification. 
15 Unfortunately, reliable data on funds are not available prior to 1991, and therefore the sample periods are 
shorter in Table 4 than in the other tables. 
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second difference case). This is a bit surprising since revenues are positively correlated with 
the two other indicators of fiscal conditions. However, surplus and funds correlates more 
strongly with each other than with the level of revenue.
16  
 
We have so far split the sample according to fiscal conditions, and the splits with respect to 
net operating surplus and funds are consistent with the hypothesis that departure from forward 
looking behavior is related to liquidity constraints imposed by BBRs. Moreover, since perfect 
forward looking behavior can not be rejected for the high surplus and high fund groups, it 
may be argued that all departure is explained by liquidity constraints and that myopia plays no 
role at all. This indirect way of ruling out myopia is not fully satisfactory, and a more direct 
test would be to split the sample according to some criteria that captures myopic behavior. 
Myopia is obviously harder to operationalize than liquidity constraints, but we suggest that 
the degree of party fragmentation in the local council is a possible indicator. We use the 
familiar Herfindahl-index as indicator of (the inverse of) party fragmentation. The 









=∑ ,                                                                                                         (9) 
 
where SHp is the share of seats in the local council held by party p and P the total number of 
parties in the council. The index can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly 
drawn members of the council belong to the same party. Alternatively, we can say that it 
captures the number of parties in the local council and the distribution of seats among them. 
The value of the index is reduced (fragmentation increases) when the number of parties 
increases and when the seats are more equally divided among a given number of parties. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Table 6 shows the results when the sample is split by the Herfindahl-index. Perfect forward 
looking behavior is clearly rejected for the two groups with medium and low values of the 
Herfindahl-index, and the estimates indicate that around 50% of their spending behavior is 
determined by permanent resources. On the other hand, the behavior of the least fragmented 
                                                           
16 The correlations between the four split criteria are displayed in Table A1 in the appendix.    15
local governments (high Herfindahl-index) is substantially more forward looking. The point 
estimate for this group indicates that nearly 90% of spending is determined by permanent 
resources, and perfect forward looking behavior can not be rejected. The estimated 
relationship between λ  and the Herfindahl-index is favorable to the understanding that the 
Herfindahl-index captures short sighted behavior, and also that the observed departure from 
forward looking behavior to some extent reflects myopia. 
 
A possible objection to the above interpretation is that the relationship between λ  and party 
fragmentation may reflect that both are related to fiscal conditions. Table A1 in the appendix 
provides some support for this, but the correlations between fiscal conditions and 
fragmentation are weak compared to the correlations between the three indicators of fiscal 
conditions. We have investigated the issue further by splitting the sample according to both 
net operating surplus and party fragmentation. In order to avoid a sharp increase in the 
number of groups, we use a 4-way classification that is obtained by first merging the medium 
and low groups in Tables 3 and 6.
17 The estimations show that fragmentation is of importance 
also after net operating surplus is controlled for. Among the local governments with medium 
or low net operating surplus, the estimated λ  is substantially lower for the subgroup with the 
least fragmented council. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the intertemporal spending behavior of Norwegian 
local governments with particular attention to liquidity constraints imposed by BBRs. The 
analyses were based on large panel data set of Norwegian local governments over the period 
1983-1996, and were carried out within the context of the so-called ‘λ - model’ developed by 
Campbell and Mankiw (1990). A first finding is that on average, local government spending 
behavior is neither perfectly forward looking nor fully myopic. Both the pooled estimates and 
the average of the estimates on split samples indicate that around 65% of local government 
spending is determined by permanent resources. The intertemporal spending behavior of 
Norwegian local governments seems to be somewhere in between their American and 
Swedish counterparts. Future research should engage in comparative studies of BBRs, 
liquidity constraints, and local government spending behavior. 
                                                           
17 In both cases the two groups appear to be quite homogeneous in terms of λ .   16
 
The main contribution by the paper is that we investigate whether departure from rational 
forward looking behavior reflects liquidity constraints or myopia. This is done by splitting the 
sample according to fiscal conditions and the party fragmentation of the local council. The 
splits by fiscal conditions demonstrate that rational forward looking behavior can not be 
rejected for the local governments with the best fiscal conditions, while such behavior is 
clearly rejected for the groups with weaker fiscal conditions. A high degree of party 
fragmentation in the local council is associated with less forward looking behavior. Our 
interpretation of these findings is that the observed departure from forward looking behavior 
reflects both liquidity constraints imposed by BBRs and myopic behavior. 
 
In Norway, central regulation of local government revenues is part of the general fiscal 
policy. Our findings question the effectiveness of this policy in terms of affecting aggregate 
demand. Given that only 35% of spending is determined by current resources, temporary 
changes in revenues have limited impact on local spending. And revenue reductions may be 
particularly ineffective in situations where the fiscal conditions are good. 
   17
Appendix  
 








                                                                                                                             (A1) 
 






= where  t R  is 













=  and t starts at 1992. 
Finally, when the sample is split by fragmentation,  it it x HERF = . In each case the 411 local 
governments are divided into 3 equally sized groups with low, medium and high values of the 
index. The correlations between the four splitting criteria are displayed in Table A1.  
 
Table A1 about here 
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Table 1 
Real spending and revenue growth, 1981-1996 
Year Spending  growth Revenue  growth 
  Average (%)       St.dev.  Average (%)       St.dev. 
1981 3.1  5.4    6.0  5.6 
1982 4.5  5.2    3.6  6.5 
1983 3.9  4.8    2.3  5.5 
1984 3.8  4.9    3.7  4.9 
1985 4.6  4.8    7.8  5.1 
1986 2.1  4.4    1.0  5.3 
1987 3.4  4.7    0.9  4.8 
1988  10.6 10.3 13.0 10.4 
1989 3.4  4.9    4.6  5.6 
1990 3.6  4.3    3.0  4.9 
1991 1.1  9.2    2.0  9.3 
1992 5.1  4.0    3.8  4.0 
1993 2.1  3.7    1.8  4.2 
1994 2.1  3.9    3.6  4.6 
1995 1.1  3.5  -1.3  3.7 
1996 1.8  3.3    1.2  4.2 
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Table 2 
Estimation results for the pooled sample 
 First  difference Second  difference 
I II  III  IV  V  VI 




































Share of population 
0-6 years 
   -0.068 
(0.043) 
   -0.072 
(0.210) 
Share of population 
7-15 years 
   0.044 
(0.033) 
   -0.157 
(0.158) 
Share of population 
80 years and above 
   0.087 
(0.027) 
   -0.065 
(0.191) 
Unemployment rate      -0.072 
(0.038) 
   -0.130 
(0.129) 
        
Estimation  period  1983-96 1983-96 1983-96 1984-96 1984-96 1984-96 
Estimation  method  OLS  GMM GMM  OLS  GMM GMM 
        
Sargan  (two-step)   112/57  117/57  111/57  113/57 
P-value  (two-step)   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
        
m1  -7.905  -8.739  -9.103  -12.817 -11.853 -11.767 
m2  -5.820 -6.184 -6.441 -0.448 -0.002 -0.002 
Note: Year fixed effects are included in all equations. The Sargan test is a joint test of valid instruments and 
correct model specification. The figures reported are respectively the test value and the degrees of freedom in 
the 
2 χ  distribution. m1 and m2 are tests for first and second order autocorrelation, and the test statistics follow a 
standard normal distribution. When the model is estimated by GMM, lagged values of revenue dated t-3 to t-7 
are used as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Sample split by net operating surplus 
 First  difference Second  difference 
 High  Medium  Low  High Medium Low 












        
Estimation  period  1983-96 1983-96 1983-96 1984-96 1984-96 1984-96 
        
Sargan (two-step)  67/57  75/57 69/57 61/56 68/56 64/56 
P-value  (two-step)    0.170 0.059 0.131 0.316 0.126 0.225 
        
m1  -2.739 -6.227 -3.584 -6.233 -8.549 -8.116 
m2  -2.257 -4.621 -3.137 0.226 -0.472 0.238 
Note: See Table 2. Separate λ ’s for 1998 and 1991 are allowed. 
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Table 4 
Sample split by funds 
 First  difference Second  difference 
 High  Medium  Low  High Medium Low 












        
Estimation  period  1992-96 1992-96 1992-96 1993-96 1993-96 1993-96 
        
Sargan (two-step)  25/14  14/14 10/14 14/13 10/13 11/13 
P-value  (two-step)    0.031 0.422 0.750 0.403 0.700 0.625 
        
m1  -3.122 -3.480 -3.917 -5.215 -6.066 -5.561 
m2  -1.735 -2.860 -3.390 -0.032 -1.647 -0.049 
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Table 5 
Sample split by revenues 
 First  difference Second  difference 
 High  Medium  Low  High Medium Low 












        
Estimation  period  1983-96 1983-96 1983-96 1984-96 1984-96 1984-96 
Estimation  method  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
        
Sargan (two-step)  57/57  61/57 85/57 60/56 53/56 71/56 
P-value  (two-step)    0.469 0.344 0.010 0.331 0.608 0.083 
        
m1  -4.913 -6.708 -5.840 -7.213 -8.947 -8.561 
m2  -2.971 -4.240 -5.072 0.433 -0.681 -0.667 
Note: See Table 2. Separate λ ’s for 1998 and 1991 are allowed.  
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Table 6 
Sample split by (inverse) party fragmentation 
 First  difference Second-difference 
 High  Medium  Low  High Medium Low 












        
Estimation  period  1983-96 1983-96 1983-96 1984-96 1984-96 1984-96 
Estimation  method  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
        
Sargan (two-step)  71/57  59/57 88/57 62/56 62/56 75/56 
P-value  (two-step)    0.104 0.388 0.006 0.275 0.266 0.049 
        
m1  -3.400 -6.749 -5.368 -7.374 -8.092 -7.210 
m2  -2.550 -4.744 -3.801 0.575 -0.261 0.420 
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Table A1 
Correlations between the split criteria 




Revenues 1.00       
Net operating surplus  0.50  1.00     
Funds  0.65 0.80 1.00  
Herfindahl-index  0.30 0.11 0.20 1.00 
 
 